Risk Aversion, Risk Preference and Farmers’ Decision to Participate in Broiler Contract Farming: A Case Study in Jember, Indonesia by Rondhi, Mohammad et al.
98 
 Caraka Tani: Journal of Sustainable Agriculture. 35(1), 98-107, 2020 
 URL: https://jurnal.uns.ac.id/carakatani/article/view/37964 
 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20961/carakatani.v35i1.37964 
ISSN 2613-9456 (Print) 2599-2570 (Online) 
 
 
Copyright © 2020 Universitas Sebelas Maret 
 
Risk Aversion, Risk Preference and Farmers’ Decision to Participate in Broiler 
Contract Farming: A Case Study in Jember, Indonesia 
 
Mohammad Rondhi, Joni Murti Mulyo Aji, Ahmad Fatikhul Khasan,  
Adinda Tissa Rachmasari Putri and Rizky Yanuarti 
Department of Agribusiness, Faculty of Agriculture, Universitas Jember, Jember, Indonesia 
*Corresponding author: rondhi.faperta@unej.ac.id 
 
Abstract 
The demand for broiler is rising rapidly due to its capability as the main animal protein source. In 
contrast, the production of broiler meat is unstable due to the possibility of farm risk. Contract Farming 
(CF) is one of the risk management tools for farmers but has not been used effectively. The purpose of 
this study was to analyze the factors that influence farmers’ decision to participate in CF. The analysis 
used six independent variables, namely farmer’s age, farm size, household size, education, farmer’s risk 
preference and risk aversion level. This study used primary data from 70 broiler farmers in Jember, 
which were divided into two groups, contract farmer and independent farmer. Each group had the same 
number of respondents. The results show that five among six independent variables significantly 
affected farmers’ decision to take part in CF. Farmer’s age decreased farmer’s probability to participate 
in CF, while education, farm size, household size and risk preference had positive effects. Farmer’s risk 
aversion level did not have any significant effect. The results suggest that the effort to expand CF 
participation should focus on young and educated farmers with large farm size. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Broiler is one of the commodities that 
contribute to national economy. Broiler farming 
has excellent prospects for development both on 
large and small scale production. The broiler 
farming period is relatively short compared to 
other livestock commodities. Broiler are 
harvested at an average age of 35 days. The rapid 
production process of broiler farming has 
attracted the attention of community and investors 
(Sunarno et al., 2017). 
Broiler is the primary source of animal protein 
for the majority of Indonesians. Its annual 
consumption in 2018 was 5,566 kg per capita. The 
average consumption growth in the period of 
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2014-2018 was 8.99% (Pusat Data dan Sistem 
Informasi Pertanian, 2018). Public consumption 
of broilers has the greatest value compared to the 
consumption of other meat commodities. 
However, people's dependence to consume broiler 
meat must be balanced with the number of broiler 
production. 
In contrast to the increasing demand, broiler 
production is unstable and fluctuating. 
Fluctuating broiler production is also an 
indication that high production risk exists in the 
farming process. Production risk can be caused by 
human resources, production inputs and natural 
factors. The high production risk is due to 
broiler’s vulnerability to diseases that causes high 
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losses for broiler breeders. It is not the only risk 
of production in broiler farming but also a price 
risk. Price risk can arise due to the instable selling 
prices. This type of risk occurs because the price 
received by the farmer is directly related to the 
traders’ decision, which causes the farmers to 
become price takers in determining the price of 
broilers (Widjayanti and Rizal, 2014). 
The high production and price risks have 
caused farmers to make decisions to overcome 
farming risks. Several farmers decide to 
participate in contract farming (CF) but some 
others run broiler farming independently. The 
partnership of farmer and company can take forms 
of production contract and marketing contract 
(Schipmann and Qaim, 2011; Boadu, 2016). 
Production contracts include the provision of 
inputs for broiler farming such as DOC, feed, 
vaccines and medicines. The marketing contract is 
carried out when the broiler produces production. 
The marketing contract requires the farmer to sell 
the production of broiler to the company at a price 
that has been settled at the beginning of the 
contract. 
According to Government Regulation of the 
Republic of Indonesia Number 44 Year 1997, CF 
is a business collaboration between small 
businesses and medium businesses and/or with 
large businesses accompanied by coaching and 
development by medium businesses and/or large 
businesses based on the principles of mutual need, 
mutual strengthening and mutual benefit. These 
make CF profitable for both parties. For farmers 
with a partnership, the availability of capital will 
be easier to ensure, and hence, the cultivation 
activities carried out can run smoothly. In 
addition, farmers require a market in selling their 
products. For partner companies, meeting the 
target capacity of broilers is highly necessary to 
meet the market demand. The existing partnership 
patterns can be divided into several types, namely 
plasma core, sub-contract, general trading, agency 
and franchise. 
The purpose of this study was to determine the 
factors contributing to the farmers’ decision to 
participate in CF. The topic becomes relevant 
since broilers are the most consumed animal 
protein sources in Indonesia but their production 
remains volatile. Furthermore, the participation 
rate of broiler farmers in CF was only 56.69% 
(BPS, 2014). Thus, there is a great opportunity for 
CF expansion. Although CF provides beneficial 
features, most farmers in Indonesia are reluctant 
to participate in CF since the farmers can lose their 
independence in making farm decisions and the 
privileges to own the products (Key, 2005).  
CF is an important instrument for agricultural 
development. A group of empirical literature have 
been summarized in Otsuka et al. (2016); 
Bellemare and Bloem (2018); Ton et al. (2018) 
that CF is an effective instrument to coordinate 
agricultural value chain and improve the quality 
of agricultural product. In addition, CF is the 
contributor to the effort to establish a sustainable 
agricultural system since one of the primary keys 
in sustainable agricultural system is an efficient 
agricultural value chain (Kamble et al., 2020) 
The research related to the factors that 
influence farmers' decisions to participate in CF 
have been conducted by Akinola (2014) and 
Wainaina et al. (2014). Factors that were found to 
be influential were generally related to 
demographic and economic variables of the 
farmers such as age, education, farming 
experience, income, number of family members, 
company participation and access to credit, farm 
size and length of partnership. While the studies 
related to the risks encountered by farmers have 
been widely carried out. Akinola (2014) and Mao 
et al. (2019) analyzed the risk preferences of 
farmers using regression functions and utility 
functions. 
In previous studies, identification of factors 
that influenced farmers' decisions to partner was 
only done by looking at demographics and 
socioeconomic variables without considering the 
farmer's risk preference and risk aversion. 
Whereas, in terms of risk, preceding studies only 
measured the risk preferences of farmers without 
discussing the level of risk aversion of farmers. 
Thus, the novelty of this study lies in the use of 
new methods to approach farmers' risk prefe-
rences and the use of farmer attitude towards risk 
as a predictor for farmer participation in CF. 
Moreover, few studies in Indonesia have explored 
the effect of farmer risk attitude on CF 
participation. 
MATERIALS AND METHOD 
Data collection 
The study was conducted in February-April 
2019 in Jember, East Java. Jember was selected as 
the location of the research because it is one of the 
broiler production centre in East Java. There were 
seven sub-districts in the research area, namely 
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Bangsalsari, Sumbersari, Pakusari, Kalisat, 
Sukowono, Ledokombo and Mumbulsari. The 
distribution of the locations is presented in  
Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of research location in Jember 
 
The population of broiler farmers in Jember 
was formally unidentified, and therefore, quota 
sampling was employed to determine the sample 
size. There were two sample groups, namely CF 
participants and independent farmer, each of 
which with broiler farmers. The determination of 
respondent was based on farmers’ partnership 
with PT XYZ. PT XYZ is an integrator that links 
broiler farmers and feed suppliers. This company 
operates mainly in Jember. The CF participants 
were selected randomly from a list provided by PT 
XYZ, while independent farmers were selected by 
snowball sampling with a criterion that the 
farmers included in this study were who practiced 
independent broiler farming. Before carrying out 
a logistic regression analysis, Method of 
Successive Interval (MSI) analysis was performed 
to calculate the value of farmers' risk preferences 
and farmers' risk aversion level. 
Farmer risk preference 
The ordinal data obtained using Likert scale 
instruments were used, in which respondents were 
asked to fill out questionnaires and give grades of 
agreement to the presented statements between 4 
to -4. Value 4 (extremely agree), 3 (strongly 
agree), 2 (agree), 1 (moderate agree), 0 (neutral), 
-1 (moderate disagree), -2 (disagree), -3 (strongly 
disagree) or -4 (extremely disagree) was given on 
each statement (Vassalos and Li, 2016). The 
statements that represent broiler farmers' prefe-
rence towards risk are summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. The statements that represent broiler 
famers risk preference 
No. Statement 
1. I would rather play safe than take a risk 
2. I avoid taking risks 
3. I prefer certainty over uncertainty 
4. I do not like to take risks 
Sources:  Vassalos and Li (2016) and Franken et al.  
(2012) 
 
The average value of breeders was used to 
determine the preferences of broiler farmers in 
facing risks. If the average value is positive, the 
breeders are classified as risk averse; if the 
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average value is = 0, the breeders are classified as 
risk neutral and if the average value is negative, 
the breeders are classified as risk takers. 
Risk aversion level 
The farmer risk aversion level was obtained 
with questions through illustrations or 
simulations. The illustrations of questions were 
based on the model proposed by Vassalos and Li 
(2016). The questions were adjusted to the 
conditions of the broiler farmers in the study area. 
The data attained were the ordinal data from 1 to 
6, which were labeled from A to F in sequence. 
After that, the data were converted into intervals 
using the MSI. 
The questions provided to farmers are as 
follows: If you have 5 broiler cages, assuming that 
each cage has a population of 5,000 broilers, then 
you are given several options to choose. 
a. Register your entire enclosure to join the 
partnership. 
b. Register some of your cages for part of the 
partnership.  
c. Do not register your entire enclosure (do not 
participate in CF). 
There was a difference between the purchase 
price of the cages included in the CF and the price 
of the cages that were not involved in the CF. If a 
farmer decided to participate in CF, the farmer 
would sell the production at contract price, which 
was agreed in the beginning of production. If the 
farmer decided not to participate in CF, the farmer 
would sell the production at market price, which 
was not informed to farmer in the beginning of 
production. The average contract price was lower 
than market price. However, the contract price 
had a stable and predictable value. Meanwhile, 
market price fluctuated, following the market 
conditions. There would be a time when market 
price was significantly higher than contract price. 
In some occasion, the market price would fall 
below the contract price. Price risk was realized 
when the market price was lower than contract 
price. 
In a good market condition, the production 
from the cage that was not included in CF would 
have a higher selling price since market price was 
higher than contract price. In this condition, the 
product that was not involved in CF was valued at 
IDR 25,000,000 per cage. This means that farmer 
would receive a revenue of IDR 25,000,000 per 
cage. Conversely, in a critical market condition, 
the market price would fall to IDR 0 per cage. In 
this situation, the farmer would not receive any 
revenue. The production from the cages that 
included in CF would have a lower but stable 
selling price of IDR 17,500,000 per cage. The 
selling price remained constant both in good and 
bad market conditions. Thus, each contracted cage 
would give farmer a revenue of IDR 17,500,000. 
Table 2 illustrates the various combinations of the 
number of cages which were included in and 
excluded from CF. 
 
Table 2. The combinations of cages which included in and excluded from the CF 
Criteria 
Number of cages 
(pieces) 
Expected revenue 
 (millions IDR) 
Risk aversion class 
Not include 
in CF 
Include in 
CF 
If the price risk 
doesn’t occur (50%) 
If the price risk 
occurs (50%) 
A 0 5 0.0 87.5 Extreme 
B 1 4 95.0 70.0 Severe 
C 2 3 102.5 52.5 Intermediate 
D 3 2 110.0 35.0 Moderate 
E 4 1 117.5 17.5 Slight to neutral 
F 5 0 125.0 0.0 Neutral to negative 
Source: Vassalos and Li (2016) 
 
Factors influencing farmers’ decision 
Logistic regression was applied to scrutinize 
the factors contributing to the decision of broiler 
breeders to participate. There were six variables 
used, namely age (year), business scale (head), 
household scale (person), education (year), risk 
preference and risk aversion level. The use of 
economic and social demographic variables such 
as age, business scale, household scale and 
education were also found in previous studies 
(Akinola, 2014; Pandey, 2016). This study added 
the use of risk preference and risk aversion levels 
to complete the explanation of the effect of 
farmers’ risk attitude on farmers' decisions. The 
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model of logistic regression used in this analysis 
is detailed below. 
 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑝𝑖
1 − 𝑝𝑖
)
=
𝑒𝑏0+𝑏1𝑋1+𝑏2𝑋2+𝑏3𝑋3+𝑏4𝑋4+𝑏5𝑋5+𝑏6𝑋6 .
1 + 𝑒𝑏0+𝑏1𝑋1+𝑏2𝑋2+𝑏3𝑋3+𝑏4𝑋4+𝑏5𝑋5+𝑏6𝑋6 .
 
 
Y was the farmer's decision to participate in 
CF (1 = participant; 0 = non-participant) and X1-6 
was the independent variable, b0 was the constant, 
b1-6 was the coefficient of each independent 
variable. The complete explanations of the used 
independent variables are depicted in Table 3. 
Before interpreting the results of a logistic 
analysis, it was necessary to test the accuracy of 
the created model by looking at the value of the 
Omnibus Test of Model Coefficients and -2 log-
likelihood. If the value of the Omnibus Test of 
Model Coefficients was significant and the 
likelihood value decreased from block 0 to block 
1, then the model was fit. 
 
Table 3. The description of logistic regression variable on farmer decision to participate in CF in 
Indonesia in 2019  
Factor Description Units Measure 
Y Decision to 
participate in CF 
Farmers decision to participate in CF (1 = participate, 
0 = do not participate) 
- Nominal 
X1 Age  
 
Farmers’ age in the year when the research was 
conducted 
Year Scale 
X2 Farm size The number of broilers in the year when the research 
was conducted 
Bird Scale 
X3 Household size 
 
The number of family members in each farm 
household 
Person Scale 
X4 Education Years in formal education from not going to school 
to master/doctor graduate 
year  Scale 
X5 Risk preference Farmers’ preference in facing risk - Ordinal 
X6 Risk aversion level RAL was obtained by using the question method with 
assumptions, according to the research conducted by 
Vassalos and Li (2016). There were six responses that 
could be chosen by farmers, each of which had a 
value ranging from 1 to 6 
MSI Scale 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The descriptive statistics of the variables can 
be seen in Table 4. CF participants had younger 
age and higher education levels than non-
participants. The CF participants most likely 
handled bigger farm-scale than non-participants 
and this could be measured from the farm size. CF 
participants had higher farm size. The household 
size of CF participants was larger than non-
participants. Farmers who participated in CF also 
had higher risk preferences and risk aversion 
level. 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics of variables in the model 
  Participating in CF Not participating in CF 
 Variable Mean Standard 
deviation 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
X1 Age (year) 44.57 1.72 60.80 1.73 
X2 Farm size (bird) 6428.57 667.41 2574.29 703.29 
X3 Household size (person) 5.26 0.23 3.14 0.23 
X4 Education (year) 10.78 0.49 6.46 0.31 
X5 Risk preference 3.44 0.18 2.29 0.16 
X6 Risk aversion level 1.98 0.11 2.55 0.17 
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The logistic regression estimation produced a 
robust result and five of six of the input variables 
had a statistically significant effect at the 95% 
confidence level. As presented in Table 5, the 
value of the Omnibus Test of Model Coefficients 
or Chi-Square had a significance of 0.000 (<0.01). 
This significance means that with a confidence 
level of 99%, there was at least one independent 
variable influencing the dependent variable. The 
overall percentage value indicated the regression 
model used was quite good. It was able to 
correctly estimate 95.7% of the conditions that 
occurred in the study area (Table 6). There was a 
decrease in the Likelihood value from block 
number 0 to block number 1. This means that the 
regression model performed better at predicting 
farmers' decision to participate in CF. In other 
words, the addition of independent variables to the 
model significantly improved the model so that 
the used model was good and appropriate to 
describe the factors putting effect on farmers’ 
decision to join CF. 
 
Table 5. The logistics regression output of factors contributing to farmers’ decision to participate in 
CF (predictors) 
Variable B S.E. t-value Exp (B) odds ratio 
Age (year) -0.311 0.154 0.044* 0.733 
Farm size (bird) 0.001 0.000 0.063* 1.001 
Household size (person) 1.778 1.019 0.081* 5.921 
Education (year) 0.773 0.458 0.091* 2.166 
Risk aversion level (X5) -3.740 0.966 0.699 0.688 
Risk preference (X6) 2.650 1.417 0.062* 14.149 
Constant -5.317 5.285 0.314 0.005 
Note: ** : significant at 99% confidence level 
  *   : significant at 95% confidence level 
 
Table 6. The logistics regression output of 
factors contributing to farmers’ 
decision to participate in CF (Model 
Goodness of Fit Tests) 
Test Value 
Omnibus Test of Model Coefficient 00.000** 
Nagelkerke R square 00.937 
-2 Log likelihood (step 0) 97.041 
-2 Log likelihood (step 1) 12.100 
Classification table (overall) 95.7% 
Note: ** : significant at 99% confidence level 
  *   : significant at 95% confidence level 
 
Farmer age had a negative influence on farmer 
decision to participate in CF. Odds ratio value 
(Exp (B)) of age was 0.733 means that older 
farmer had a lower tendency to play a part in CF 
by 0.733 times compared to younger farmer, 
assuming that the other variables were constant. 
The younger farmers would tend to choose to 
participate in CF. This was because young farmers 
had an open mind in the latest developments in 
agriculture, especially the model of CF. On the 
other hand, older farmers were difficult and 
reluctant to accept new developments such as 
adopting the concept of CF in broiler farming. 
Vassalos and Li (2016) have also stated that older 
farmers are less likely to be involved in CF. This 
is because in older age, farmers will be difficult to 
commit long-term contracts or agreements and 
they have less willingness to trust others to handle 
their farming process. 
Farm size had a positive influence on farmers' 
decisions to participate in CF. The odds ratio 
value was 1.001, meaning that farmers with larger 
farm size had a tendency to participate in CF by 
1.001 times compared to farmer with smaller farm 
size, assuming the other variables were in a 
constant state. The farmers with large farm size 
would consider that when a failure occurred, it 
would cause large losses. In order to reduce 
damages, the breeders choose to share the risk of 
loss with the company through CF. On the 
contrary, farmers with smaller farm size argued 
that when a failure occurred, it would lead to a 
relatively smaller loss. Farmers believed that 
participating in CF was not necessary. This is in 
line with Arumugam et al. (2011); Franken et al. 
(2012); Hu (2012) and MacDonald and Korb 
(2012), who have detailed that large scale farming 
tends to encourage farmers to protect their 
businesses by participating in CF. However, a 
negative effect of farm size on CF participation 
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was found on farmers who had a contract with 
supermarket in China (Miyata et al., 2009). 
Household size had a positive effect on 
farmers’ decision to participate in CF. The odds 
ratio of household size was 5.921, signifying that 
farmers with larger household sizes would have 
the tendency to participate in CF by 5.921 times 
more, compared to farmers with smaller 
household size, assuming that the other variables 
were in a constant state. This is different from 
Akinola (2014), who has stated that the larger the 
household size is, the less likely it is for farmer to 
participate in CF. In the research area, farmers 
with larger household size tended to think that the 
living cost would also increase. Therefore, they 
required stable income and small risk of failure 
and those could achieved by contributing in CF. 
Furthermore, large household size provided more 
labor since CF is labor intensive on the farmer part 
(Swain, 2012). In addition, farmers with large 
household size tended to participate in resource-
providing contract such as broiler CF (Ba et al., 
2019). However, in a marketing contract, 
household size appeared to have insignificant 
effect to farmers’ participation in CF (Bellemare 
and Bloem, 2018). 
Education had a positive effect on farmers’ 
decision to play a part in CF. This is in line with 
the results of studies by Freguin-Gresh et al. 
(2012); Ito et al. (2012) and Pandey (2016). The 
odds ratio value was 2.166, denoting that farmers 
with higher education would have more 
tendencies to take part in CF by 2.166 times more, 
compared to farmers with lower education levels, 
assuming that other variables were constant. 
Farmers with higher education believed that 
participating in CF would contribute to more 
efficient broiler production to reduce losses. On 
the other hand, farmers with lower education 
would assume that CF was a highly complex 
concept to be applied in the business of broilers.  
Holly Wang et al. (2011) have stated that 
higher levels of formal education can increase 
farmers' awareness on the importance of 
participating in CF. However, a consensus in 
international literature regarding the sign and 
significance of education on CF participation has 
not been available. Wang et al. (2014) have 
uncovered that education is an insignificant 
predictor of CF participation. Meanwhile, 
Simmons et al. (2005) have specified that the 
effect of education on CF participation depends 
on the type of contracted commodities. This 
explains that education has a nonlinear effect to 
CF participation (Miyata et al., 2009) 
Risk aversion level did not have any 
significant effect on farmers' decision to 
participate in CF. This finding is corresponding to 
the results of the studies by Guo et al. (2005); Guo 
and Jolly (2008); Vassalos and Li (2016). The 
results of interview have showed that farmers who 
did not play a part in CF also had a desire to do so, 
but there were conditions that they could not 
fulfill. They assumed that the minimum scale of 
farming was large. On the contrary, farmers who 
already participated in CF seemed to have a 
tendency to be independent, but they had some 
difficulties in preparing a large amount of capital 
in the beginning of the production process. 
Both groups had propensity whether they 
wanted to participate or did not take part in CF. 
The farmers’ tendency caused their attitude in 
avoiding risk to become slightly unclear, and thus 
this directly affected the analysis of farmers’ risk 
aversion level. This ambiguity has been discussed 
by Peng and Pang (2019), who found that farmers’ 
risk aversion increased with the farm size. In 
contrast with our research finding, Lyu and Barré 
(2017); Belissa et al. (2019) and Yanuarti et al. 
(2019) have found that farmer’s risk aversion 
level had a significant influence towards their 
decision to participate in insurance. Farmers with 
high risk aversion would be willing to join 
agricultural insurance.  
Risk preference had a positive effect, implying 
that when the average point was greater, the 
farmers were more likely to participate in CF. The 
result is in agreement with the Ghanaian 
pineapple farmers’ contract choices (Fischer and 
Wollni, 2018). The odds ratio value was 14.149, 
signifying that farmers with a high-risk preference 
had a higher tendency to be involved in CF 14.149 
times compared to farmers who had lower risk 
preference with assumptions that other variables 
were constant. Primary data indicate that when the 
farmers’ risk preference was lower, the farmers 
would be more willing to practice farming 
independently, including the stages from the 
capital preparation until the marketing process of 
broilers. If there was not any price risk, 
independent farmers would be able to generate 
maximum profit that was higher that the profit of 
those who took part in CF because the selling 
price of independent farmers would be higher. 
Moreover, independent farmer would not have to 
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share their profit with the company. The results of 
farmers’ risk preference are presented in Table 7. 
 
Table 7. The risk preference distribution of 
broiler farmers against price risks in 
broiler farming in Jember 
Risk 
preference 
Total (people) Percentage (%) 
CF Non-CF CF Non-CF 
Risk taker 5 22 7 32 
Risk neutral 0 3 0 4 
Risk averese 30 10 43 14 
Total 35 35 50 50 
 
The results of logistic regression analysis have 
revealed that the variables that significantly 
affected the farmers' decision to participate in CF 
were age (X1), chicken population (X2), number 
of household members (X3), education (X4) and 
risk preference (X6). Whereas, variable that did 
not significantly put effect on farmers' decision to 
partake in CF was risk aversion level (X5). 
CONCLUSIONS 
The significant factors influencing farmers' 
decision to participate in CF were age, farm size, 
household size, education and farmer risk 
preference. Meanwhile, farmer risk aversion level 
was found insignificant. From those significant 
variables, age had negative coefficient while the 
others had a positive effect on farmers’ decision 
to participate in CF. This study concludes that risk 
aversion level does not have any statistically 
significant effect on farmers’ decision to be 
involved in CF. The effect of risk aversion level 
might be confounded with other variable such as 
age and education. Based on the results of this 
study, the effort to expand CF participation should 
focus more on young and educated farmers who 
have large farm size. 
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